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Summary findings
In the past 35 years, China, Hong Kong, Korea,  new technologies they were adopting from more
Singapore.,  and Taiwan (China) have transformed  advanced industrial nations. They see investment in
themselves from technologically backwards and poor  human and physical capital as an essential but far from
economies to relatively modern, affluent economies.  sufficient part of assimilation. In addition, people must
Each has experienced more than a fourfold increase in  learn about, take the risk of operating, and come to
per capita income. In each, a significant number of firms  master technologies and other practices new to the
are producing technologically complex products  country, if not the world. The emphasis for assimilation
competitive with firms in Europe, Japan, and the United  theorists is on innovation and learning, rather than on
States. Their growth performance has exceeded that of  marshalling. If one marshals but does not innovate and
virtually all comparable economies. How they did it is a  learn, development does not follow. These are complex
question of great importance.  theories that raise as many questions as they answer.
Virtually all theories about how they did it place  Nelson and Pack discuss differences in the way the two
investments in capital stock at the center of the  groups of theorists treat four matters:
explanation. Nelson and Pack divide most growth  *  Entrepreneurial  decisionmaking.
theories about the Asian miracle into two groups:  *  The nature of technology.
* The "accumulation" theories stress the role of  *  The economic capabilities possible with a well-
capital investments in moving these economies "along  educated work force.
their production  functions." What lies behind rapid  - The role exports play in a country's rapid
development, according to this type of theory, is very  development.
high investment rates. If a nation makes the investments,  The differences between the theories matter because
marshals the resources, development will follow.  they affect our understanding of why the Asian miracle
- The "assimilation" theories stress the  happened and because they imply different things about
entrepreneurship,  innovation, and learning these  appropriate economic development policy.
economies went through before they could master the
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II.  Accumulation and Assimilation Theories of the Asian Miracle
Over the past thirty-five years Korea, Taiwan,China, Singapore, and Hong
Kong, have transformed themselves from technologically backwards and poor, to
relatively modern and affluent economies.  Each has experienced more  than a
four  fold  increase  of  per  capita  incomes.  Each  now  has  a  significant
collection  of  firms  producing  technologically  complex  products  competing
effectively against rival firms based in the United States, Japan, and Europe.
The  growth  performance  of  these  countries  has  vastly  exceeded  those  of
virtually all other economies that had comparable productivities and income
levels in 1960.  On  these grounds alone the question of  "how they  did it"
obviously is of enormous scientific and policy importance.
It  has  been  less  well  noted  that  their  growth  has  been  historically
unprecedented. The development of Japan in the half century after the Meiji
restoration is widely regarded as comparable.  However, Japan's per  capita
growth rate over this period was less than half that of the Asian nics since
1960. Of  course,  growth rates  in general  were  slower  during  this  earlier
period.  But  the  rate of  catch  up by  the  nics  still  is  remarkable.  It
certainly would  seem that  there  is  an  "Asian Miracle" that  cries  out  for
explanation.
Of  course,  economists have  not  been  blind  to  or  unattracted by  the
challenge.  Over the last decade a number of different theories have been put
forth purporting to explain the "Asian Miracle."  (Amsden 1989, Kim and Lau
1994, Krugman 1994, Pack and  Westphal  1986, Rodrik  1994, Westphal  Kim  and
Dahlman  1985, World  Bank  1993,  Young  1993). There  is  unanimity  among  the
different theories regarding the identity of some of the key causal factors.
All of the Asian nics have experienced rapid growth of their physical capital
stock.  All have been marked by very high rates of investment  in human capital.
Virtually all theories about "how they did it" place these investments center
stage in the explanation.
However,  there  are  significant differences  in  the  causal  mechanisms
stressed.  At the risk of doing some violence to the actual diversity, for our
purposes we find it useful to divide up theories of the Asian Miracle into two
groups.  One group, which we will call "accumulation"  theories, stresses the
role of these investments in moving these economies "along their production
functions."  The  other group,  which we  will  call  "assimilation" theories,
stresses the entrepreneurship,  innovation  and learning that these economies had
to go through before they could master the new technologies they were adopting
from the more  advanced industrial nations; it  sees investment in human  and
1physical  capital  as  a  necessary,  but  far  from  sufficient,  part  of  the
assimilation  process.
The  "accumulation"  theory  has  been  pushed  hard  over  the  past  few  years  by
several  economists,  in  a  way  clearly  designeci  to  strip  away  most  of  the
"miraculous"  from  the  Asian  miracle.  What  lies  behind  rapid  development  is,
simply,  very  high  investment  rates.  Economists  who  take  this  point  of  view  do
not  deny  that  adoption  and  mastering  new  technology  and  other  modern  practices
was  an  important  part  of  the  story.  Rather,  the  position  is  that  one  should
try  to  explain  as  much  as  one  can  in  terms  of  investments  that  enable  movements
along  a  production  function,  and  see  if  anything  much  is  left  over,  thus
requiring  explanation  on  other  grounds.  Several  economists  who  have  followed
this  path  find  that,  according  to  their  calculations,  the  lion's  share  of
increased  output  per  worker  can  be  explained  simply  by  increases  in  physical
and  human  capital  per worker.  Thus  there  is  little  need  to  assign  much  of  the
credit  for  the  growth  "miracle"  to  entrepreneurship,  innovation,  or  learning,
except  insofar  as  these  are  terms  given  to  the  shift  to  more  capital  and
education  intensive  ways  of  production.  (See  e.g.  Young  1993,  Kim  and  Lau  1994,
Krugman  1994).
To  assimilation  theorists,  this  point  of  view  seems  odd.  The
technologies  that  the  nics  came  progressively  to  master  during  the  1970's  and
1980's were  ones  with  which,  in  1960,  they  had  no  experience  at  all...  To  learn
to  use  them  effectively  required  the  development  of  new  sets  of  skills,  new
ways  of  organizing  economic  activity,  and  becoming  familiar  with  and  competent
in  new  markets.  To  do  this  was  far  from  a  routine  matter,  but  involved  risk
taking  entrepreneurship  as  well  as  good  management.  (  See  e.g.  Pack  and
Westphal  1986,  Dahlman  1994,  Amsden  1989.)  What  makes  the  Asian  miracle
miraculous  is  that  these  countries  did  these  things  so  well,  while  other
countries  were  much  less  successful.  To  be  sure,  adopting  the  technologies  of
the  advanced  countries  required,  among  other  things,  high  rates  of  investment
in  physical  and  human  capital,  and  the  nics  achieved  these  high  rates.  But  to
say  that  these  investments  simply  enabled  these  economies  to  "move  along  their
production  functions"  seems  a  strange  use  of  language.  At  the  least,  it  poses
the  question  of  just  what  is  meant  by  "moving  along  a  production  function."
Are  we  drawing  a  distinction  without  a  real  difference?  We do  not  think
so.  The  accumulation  account  stresses,  simply,  investments.  The  message  is
that  other  countries  could  have  done  as  well  as  the  successful  nics  if  they  had
made  the  same  investment  effort.  If  the  nation  makes  the  investments,  marshals
the  resources,  development  will  follow.  In  contrast,  the  assimilation  account
stresses  learning  about,  risking  to  operate,  and  coming  to  master,  technologies
2and other practices that are new to the country, if not to the world.  The
"marshalling  of inputs"  is part of the story,  but the emphasis is on innovation
and  learning,  rather than  on  marshalling.  Under  this  view,  if  when  one
marshals  but does not innovate  and learn,  development  does not follow.
A convinced accumulationist  might respond  by saying  that, if one educates
the people, and provides them with modern equipment to work with, they will
learn.  An assimilationist  might respond that the Soviet Union, and the Eastern
European  communist  economies, took  exactly  that  point  of  view,  made  the
investments, and didn't learn. 1 There is nothing automatic about the learning
business.  The response  of the accumulationist  might be that the old communist
countries provided an  economic environment where there was  no  incentive to
learn to be efficient, either in a technological or an economic sense, much
less to innovate.  The assimilation  theorist  might agree,  but then propose that
it is important to understand, therefore, just how the successful nics did it.
The accumulationist would reply that they got the prices right and made the
necessary  public  investments.  Economists  who  stress  entrepreneurship,
innovation, and learning would reply that it is not all that simple, and point
to countries like Spain that have had high investment rates, and have got most
of the prices right, but which are growing at far lower rates than the Asian
nics.
The difference between the theories shows up strikingly in the way they
treat the following four  matters:  what is involved in entrepreneurial  decision
making, the nature of technology, the economic capabilities lent by  a  well
educated work force, and the role that exporting played in  these countries'
rapid development.
Accumulationists pay  little explicit attention to  firms, seeing their
behavior as being basically determined  by the environment - the incentives and
constraints  - they face,  which determines the actions that are most profitable.
Assimilation theorists, on the other hand,  see entrepreneurial firms, and
their ability to learn rapidly, as  a critical factor behind the success of
Korea and Taiwan,China, with their behavior supported by their environments,
but only partially determined by external forces.  (See e.g. Hobday 1995, and
Kim forthcoming.)  For an assimilation  theorist, at least our brand, when firms
contemplate venturing on to ground that is new for them, the profitability of
Easterly  and  Fischer,  1995,  stress  the  low  ex  post  elasticity  of
substitution  as  an  explanation of  slow  Soviet  growth. This  could  also  be
interpreted  as  reflecting  insufficient effort  to  identify  and  master  new
technology.
3such venturing is highly uncertain,  in the sense of  Knight.  Some firm managers
will dare to venture; others will choose  to stick close to the familiar.  Thus,
what firms do is determined  by the daring of their decision makers, as well as
by their environment.  And whether an entrepreneurial effort will  succeed or
fail also is only partly determined by environmental factors.  It depends, as
well, on the zeal and smarts and learning abilities of  firm management and
workers.
Part of the difference here resides in how the different theories see
technology.  Accumulationists seem to believe that the state of technological
knowledge  at  any  time  is  largely  codified  in  blueprints  and  associated
documents and that, for a firm to adopt a technology that is new to it but not
to  the  world, primarily  involves getting  access to  those  blueprints.  In
contrast, assimilationists  argue that only a smal:!  portion of what one needs to
know to employ a technology is codified in the form of blueprints; much of it
is tacit and learning  is as much by doing and using as by reading and studying.
(See e.g.  Nelson and  Winter  1982, and  Rosenberg 1994.)  More,  while  many
economists believe  that  technology is  defined in  terms  of  engineering  and
physical  science,  in  fact  the  lines  between  the  engineering  aspects  of
technology, and  the  organizational aspects, are  blurry,  and  controlling  a
technology often involves knowing how to manage a very complex  division of
labor as much as it involves  knowing  the relevant  lphysics  and chemistry.
Both of these differences show up in terms of how the two theories go
about explaining the  fact that the  nics were  able  to increase  greatly and
rapidly their capital-labor  ratios (by  more than four fold over the thirty five
years in question) without experiencing a significant decline in the rate of
return to capital.  The accumulationist  is inclined to try to explain in terms
of the technological alternatives that were available to firms in the nics.
The ability to hold off diminishing returns is a reflection of the fact that
the nics could draw on a very extensive frontier  of technologies that  already
were in use in other countries.  The richness of the frontier was manifest in
the fact that the "elasticity  of substitution"  was high.
The assimlationist, on the other hand, would argue it is misleading and
incomplete  analytically,  to try to specify a set of technological  possibilities
without  considering  the  decision  makers'  ability  to  search  and  see  and
effectively take on board new technology.  That is, what the accumulationist
would explain in terms of the nature of the parameters of a  conventionally
defined production  function, an  assimilationist would  explain  in  terms  of
skillful  entrepreneurship  and learning.
4Along the same lines,  the two theories also differ regarding  how they see
the effects of the rapidly  rising education levels in these countries.  For the
accunmulationist,  rising human capital is treated simply as an increase in the
quality or effectiveness  of  labor.  Assimilationists,  on the other hand, tend
to see the effects of sharply  rising educational attainments,  in particular the
creation by  these countries of  a  growing cadre of  reasonably well  trained
engineers and applied scientists, in ways similar to that  sketched out many
years ago by Nelson and Phelps, 1966.  Well educated managers, engineers, and
workers  have  a  comparative  advantage  in  seeing  new  opportunities  and
effectively learning new things.  Thus the growing human capital of the nics
was a very important support for successful  entrepreneurship.
Note that the difference  *here  *mirrors  the difference regarding how  to
interpret the high  ex-post elasticity of  substitution.  The accumulationist
sees both the ability to hold off diminishing returns to capital and the high
economic returns to education in terms of the parameters of a conventionally
defined production function.  The assimilationist sees both as manifestations
of the effective learning  that was going on.
This same difference between the two theories also shows up sharply in
how they treat the strong export performance of the nic manufacturing firms.
The accumulationists tend to see the steep rise in manufacturing exports as
just what one would expect in economies where the stocks of physical and human
capital were rising rapidly, and shifting comparative advantage towards the
sectors that employed these inputs intensively.  From this perspective, there
is nothing noteworthy  about the surge of manufacturing  exports, save that it is
evidence  that  the  economic  policies  of  these  countries  let  comparative
advantage work its ways.  In contrast, the assimilationists,  while not denying
that  the  nics  were  building a  comparative advantage in  various  fields of
manufacturing, tend to highlight the active efforts by government to induce,
almost force, firms  to try to export, and the entrepreneurship,  innovation, and
learning the firms  had to do in order to compete effectively in world markets,
even with government  support.
Economists  of  the  assimilation  school  have  argued  that  exporting
stimulated and  supported  strong  learning in  two  ways  (Westphal, Kim,  and
Dahlman, 1985, Pack and Westphal 1986).  First, being  forced to  compete in
world  markets made the managers and engineers in the firms pay close attention
to world standards.  Second, much of the exporting involved contracting with
American or  Japanese firms who both demanded high performance and  provided
assistance to achieve it.  The story here clearly is different than one which
sees the development of these new competencies as, simply, the more or  less
5automatic result  of  changing  factor  availabilities which  called  them  into
being.
We have noted that the assimilationist's  position, at least the one we
espouse, sees the high rates of investment by the nics in physical and human
capital as  a necessary, if not a  sufficient, component of the  assimilation
process.  These high rates themselves  are remarkable, even if not miraculous.
Under the argument of the assimilationists, the!se  investments were at  least
partially induced by, and sustained  by, the rapid innovation and learning that
was going on.
Successful  entrepreneurship  in the nics certainly  was facilitated  by the
growing supply of well trained technical  people. On the other hand, it was not
automatic that newly  trained engineers would  find work  in  entrepreneurial
firms.  There  had  to  be  entrepreneurial  firms  in  which  to  work,  or  the
opportunity to found new ones.  Thus in the nics aggressive entrepreneurship
supported and encouraged rapidly rising educational attainment, and served to
make these investments economically productive.  In contrast, in many  other
countries initially as poor as Korea and Taiwan,China, the market for college
graduates  was  almost  exclusively the  Governmen'l  bureaucracies, where  their
skills  arguably  made  little contribution  to economic development.
Successful production of new products almost always required that firms
acquire new  physical capital.  There's no  question that policies  in  these
countries encouraged saving.  But  on the  other hand, what  made  saving  and
investment profitable was the strong and effective innovative performance of
the firms that were entering  new lines of business.
We think it apparent that the two broad theories differ both in their
causal structures, and  in the  hints they give about  "how to  do  it."  The
emphasis of the  accumulationists is on getting investment rates up  and the
prices right.  The message of the assimilation theorists is that successful
industrial  development  requires  innovation  and  learning  to  master  modern
technologies; effective innovation and learning dJepend  on investments, and a
market environment  that presses for efficient allocations,  but it involves much
more.  And,  indeed, to  a  considerable extent, the  investments needed  are
induced  by successful  entrepreneurship.
Section II considers the argument that careful attention to the numbers
and  rigorous calculation supports the accumulationist theory, and  there  is
little evidence that innovation and learning played much of a role.  We argue
that the commonly used calculations  do not do whal their proponents claim.  In
Section III, we propose a different way for discriminating  between a change in
6output  accompanied by  changes  in  inputs that  can  be  considered simply  "a
movement along the production function," and a change that seems to involve
innovation and learning.  In the light of the argument we develop there, in
section IV we consider the evidence. We propose that that evidence strongly
supports the assimilationist's case.  Section V  considers in what  ways the
differences  between the two theories  matter.
II.  Why  the  Standard Calculations in Fact Don't Discriminate
The case put forward  by its proponents for the accumulationist theory is
based on calculations of two sorts.  One is a growth accounting.  The other
involves  fitting a dynamic production function.  In both methods the strategy
is, basically, to try to calculate  the effect of input growth on output growth,
holding the "production function" constant, and see  (under  growth accounting)
if anything much is left over as a "residual,"  or  (under  production function
fitting) whether  the passage of  time itself  seems to  contribute to  output
growth over and above what is explained by input growth over time.  We argue
here  that,  contrary  to  widespread  views  in  economics,  neither  kind  of
calculation can separate out growth that "would  have occurred without technical
advance" from growth  that involved  technical  advance.
It often is not recognized adequately that the simple logic of growth
accounting is only applicable to the analysis of small changes in inputs and
outputs.  (See e.g. Nelson 1973.)  The procedure basically  involves making
estimates of the marginal productivities (or output partial elasticities) of
the various inputs that have changed and, in effect, using these to calculate
the contribution of input expansion to output growth by using a first order
Taylor series.  However, in the case of the Asian tigers the investments whose
contribution to growth is being estimated have been cumulatively very large.
While repressed by the format of growth accounting, which usually sets up the
calculations in terms of average yearly changes, and thus makes the changes
appear  relatively  small,  in  the  countries in  question  capital  per  worker
increased more  than  four times  over the  past three  decades,  and  years  of
average  educational  attainment  also increased  greatly.
The  calculations  in  standard  growth  accounting  take  marginal
productivities  as  estimated  by  factor  prices  (or  output  elasticities  as
estimated by factor shares) as exogenous.  However, under the assumptions of
neoclassical  production function theory (which  lie behind the growth accounting
logic), large finite changes in inputs can lead to large finite changes in
marginal productivities. Table 1 shows, for a  CES production function, what
7happens to the share of capital, initially at  .3, for different proportional
increases  in  the  capital-labor  ratio,  for  different  elasticities  of
substitution. Note that for small increases, capital's share does not change
very much, regardless of the elasticity of substitution.  For large changes,
however, the elasticity of substitution makes a huge difference in terms of
what happens to  capital's share. For example, :300%  increase in  the capital
labor ratio and an elasticity of substitution of  .2 implies a decline in the
capital  share from .30  to .0017.
We know that, in the countries in question,  despite the large changes in
their quantities, the rates of  return on  physical capital and  on education
stayed high.  Indeed,  capital's share of output certainly didn't fall much and
may  have  increased.  We  noted  earlier  that  one  explanation  is  that
technologically determined  elasticities  of  substitution,  in  the  sense  of
standard production function theory, were  quite high,  and  thus  significant
increases in  these  inputs relative to others  had  only  a  modest  effect  on
marginal  productivities as  the  economy moved  along  its  ex-ante  production
function.  Under this explanation a good share of output increase indeed would
have occurred without any technical advance.  This seems to be the implicit
argument  of  the  proponents  of  the  accumulation theory.  However,  another
explanation is that the elasticities of substitution, defined in the standard
way,  were  quite  low,  and  that  only  the  rapid  taking  on  board  of. new
technologies  prevented the sharp diminishing  returns and falling partial output
elasticities for the factors that increased most that one would have observed
had  these economies stayed on  the production functions that  existed at  the
start of the development  traverse.
Consider the latter explanation, which we believe is the correct one.
Under it, innovation  and rapid learning  are driving growth.  However, a growth
accounting of a  standard sort might  show a  very  small residual, or  even  a
negative  one.  The factor  shares of the more rapidly  growing factors - physical
and human capital - would be and would remain high, as a consequence of the
rapid learning that made  their continued expanslon productive. Rapid  factor
accumulation was not an exogenous phenomenon but  a response to high private
profitability.  A growth  accounting  might "attribute"  the lion's share of output
growth to input growth.  There would be little left to explain in terms  of
innovation and  learning, despite the fact that these are the  basic  factors
driving  growth.
The use by some scholars of the Tornqvist index for the weights applied
to input increases  represents  acknowledgement  that, if one is interested in the
impact on  output of  finite changes of inputs  along a  production  function,
Boutput elasticities can change along the way.  But the use of such an index
(as  by Young, 1995)  does not deal with the problem highlighted  here.  The index
uses actual shares for each year throughout the period.  But the actual shares
at the end of the period can be, and in the case in question almost surely
were, affected by the technological  changes that occurred over the period.  In
general  they  are  not  what  the  shares  would  have  been  at  the  new  input
quantities had the production function stayed constant over the traverse. As
shown in Table 1, the evolution of shares  depend on the value of the elasticity
of substitution and the magnitude of the increase in the capital-labor ratio.
Also, while not shown in Table 1, they also depend on technical change itself.
It is thus inappropriate to use the observed factor shares as weights since
they assume something one is trying to estimate, namely, TFP growth.2
We want to underline this point because many economists seem to believe
that the absence of a large residual in a growth accounting is strong evidence
that  the  lion's  share  of  growth  was  due  to  movements  along  a  prevailing
production function.  This is just not so if the input changes involved are
large.  Growth accounting alone cannot tell whether the relevant elasticities
of substitution were large or small, and thus cannot distinguish between the
two  stories  sketched  above  about  the  sources  of  growth.  There  is  an
"identification"  problem.
One might  think that the fitting of a dynamic production function can
avoid this  logical limitation of growth accounting, when  input  changes are
2  The following  equations can be derived for the rate of change of factor
shares for a general production function,  Q =  f(K,  mL) in terms of the initial
share of capital, a, the elasticity substitution,  a, and the rate of Harrod-
neutral, labor augmenting  technical  change,  m:
SK  =  (1-a)  (1-  a )/d]  (m - k)  (1)
SL  =  [a)  (1- c  )/a]  (k'- m)  (2)
Equations (1) and (2) show that the factor shares utilized in Tornqvist
calculations will be  affected by  both technical change, in this  case labor
augmenting, and changes in capital-intensity.  The impact will be  smaller the
greater  a  and m. In estimating  the Tornqvist  index of inputs,
T =  £i [1/2  (Si,,  - Si,t-,)  (ln  xi,t  - ln xi,  t  ),  (3)-
The Si,,  are taken to be exogenous and, assuming competitive input markets,  (3)
measures  the contribution of inputs xi  to output.  T is then substracted
from the log difference in output to obtain the desired measure of TFP growth.
But  the  Si,t  are  not  in  fact  exogenous but  are  themselves  affected  by
technical change as shown in (1)  and (2).
9large and finite.  However, in practice the identification problem cannot be
resolved this way.
The basic issue in question is how much of experienced growth of output
per  worker  can  be  ascribed  simply  to  the  large  experienced  increases  in
physical  and  human  capital per  worker  that  were  achieved  over  the  period
between 1960 and 1995,  and without recourse  to the argument  that the production
function "shifted".  Let us focus on the growth of physical capital.  Table 2
shows, for a CES production function, the increase in output per worker that
would be generated for different increases in the capital-labor ratio, and for
different values  of  the  elasticity of  substitution.  As  with  our  earlier
analysis of what happens to capital's share, for large changes in the capital
labor ratio, the elasticity  of substitution  matters, a lot.
Consider then the two "explanations,"  depicted in Figure I, for a large
increase in output  per worker, between time one and time two, associated with a
large increase in capital per worker.  In the explanation on the left hand
side,  in  which  the  elasticity  of  substitution is  assumed  large,  much  of
experienced  labor  productivity  increase would  have  occurred  even  had  the
economy stayed on its production function  of period one (the  dotted curve). The
way the production function is drawn depicts only weak diminishing returns to
increasing capital intensity.  The firm or econoray  in question is presumed to
know,  at  time  one,  how  to  operate  effectively  at  much  higher  capital
intensities  than  were  employed  then,  but  chooses  not  to  do  so  because
prevailing factor prices made  it more  profitable to operate at  low  capital
intensity.  Between time one and time two, factor  availabilities  changed.
In  contrast, in  the  explanation on  the  right hand  side,  experienced
productivity growth is almost totally the result of the establishment of a new
production function (the solid curve) in  that very little productivity growth
would have occurred had the economy remained on  its  old production function.
Under this explanatory story, at time one the firm or economy in question knew
very little about how to operate effectively at significantly higher capital
intensities.  (The  elasticity of substitution that would have obtained if the
firm had been  limited to  operating technologies it  knew initially was  very
low.) To have increased capital  per worker without learning about and learning
to  use new techniques would very quickly have  led to low  or  zero marginal
returns.  Thus the economy, in order to  deal productively with the  changed
factor  price  regime  of  period  two,  had  to  do  a  lot  of  "learning,"  or
"innovating,"  and in fact it did.
10Both explanations  fit the data at time one and two.  The "levels"  and the
"slopes" of the old production functions are the same at  time one, and  the
levels and slopes of the new production functions are the same at time two.
This point was highlighted by  Diamond, McFadden, and  Rodriguez  (1971), and
Nelson (1973),  over twenty years ago.  It seems to have been forgotten.
When one "fits"  a dynamic production function  statistically (through  many
not just two points and slopes), how does one discriminate between these two
explanations?  Obviously one needs  to place  some  restrictions on  the  form
fitted, for example, that the rate and direction of  "technical advance" be
constants over the period, or that the underlying production function always
have a particular "kind of general shape."  Most of the econometric exercises
we are concerned  with here have imposed  relatively  loose restrictions,  although
sufficient to enable a best fitting equation to be calculated.  However, even
if an equation  that looks like the left hand side explanation  wins the "maximum
likelihood" contest (as  in Kim and Lau, 1994),  if the constraints  on functional
form are relatively  loose it is a good bet that an equation that looks like the
right  hand  side  explanation is  not  very  far  behind.  Standard  regression
techniques  of  the  sort  that  have  been  employed  do  not  enable  confident
acceptance of one explanation  and rejection  of the other.
The graphs drawn in Figure 1 are in fact regressions estimated from the
actual data for Korea's  manufacturing sector for the years 1962-91.  The dynamic
production function fitted to  the data is a  standard CES, with two inputs-
capital and labor- and constant returns to scale.  To keep the analysis simple
and transparent  we constrained  technological  advance to be neutral and constant
over the period in question.  The key parameters to be estimated are r, the
rate of technological  progress, and e, the elasticity of substitution.
In the left  hand figure  we forced e to be large, .9.  Since growth of K/L
then "explains"  a lot of the growth  of Q/L, the estimated  rate of technological
change, r,  came out  low,  .016.  For regression runs  in which we  set e  as
greater than one, the estimated rate of technological  change was even smaller.
In any case, once the analyst built in a term accounting for the effects of
rising educational attainments, there would be little room for "technological
advance" in the explanation  for economic growth.  In the right hand figure we
constrained e to be low, .2.  Since under this constraint the growth of K/L
cannot "explain"  much of the growth  of Q/L, the estimated rate of technological
progress, r, came out high, .045.  While growing human capital can cut down on
this figure, taking this factor into account is unlikely to make the rate of
estimated technological  progress trivial.
11Both of these regressions,  and one in which all parameters were chosen by
least squares, yield values of R 2 of around .98, leaving little to choose among
the regressions  on a statistical  basis. Again, we want to underline the point.
The fact that the best fit of a dynamic function provides an explanation for
growth in which  technological advance plays  a small role, and  input growth
accounts  for  the  lion's  share  of  growth,  does  not  itself  provide  strong
evidence against the argument  that, in fact, growth would have been far less if
there had not been significant technological advance.  Only the imposition of
oarticular constraints on the dynamic production function enables econometric
techniaue to choose between the explanation  on the left had side and the right
hand side of Figure I.  These constraints are basically arbitrary.  And  the
imposition  of  somewhat  different  ones  can  change  radically  the  estimated
contribution  of technical  advance in the attribution.
The authors in question certainly  have  been careful with their data, and
in the use of their methods.  The problem is that the methods employed just
don't do the job they are thought to do.  Nor, at this stage of our argument,
are we introducing "new  data", although  we agree that the issue is an empirical
one.  Before considering new evidence, it would seem important to do some
rethinking of the  kind of data that would discriminate between growth where
entrepreneurship,  innovation, and learning were central, and growth where they
were not.
III.  Back to Basics
How is one to decide between two different explanations, each broadly
compatible with the macroeconomic data, when one stresses "movements along a
production function" and  the other emphasizes "entrepreneurship, innovation,
and learning"?  We propose that to get an empiric:al  answer requires that one
first ask some conceptual  questions.  What might one mean when one says that an
observed  change  in  inputs  and  outputs  simply  reflected  a  move  along  a
production function?  What might one mean if one argued it was not that simple,
but that entrepreneurship  and innovation in fact were involved?  If we agreed
on answers to these conceptual  questions  we might be able to agree on what kind
of empirical  evidence  would be relevant.
Regarding  what we economists  seem to mean by "a  move along the production
function," reflect on  the  simple treatment  in  undergraduate microeconomics
texts. The production function,  there, is said to be the "efficiency frontier"
of the "production  set" - the set of all input-output  combinations a firm can
choose among.  One way of explaining the set to students is to say that a firm
12"knows"  a  certain  set  of  production  techniques  or  activities,  and  the
production set is generated by different levels and mixes of those activities
that a firm might choose.  In any case, the firm is viewed as both "knowing
about" each of the alternatives,  and "knowing  how" to do whatever is associated
with achieving the input-output  vector  associated  with each.
The verbal articulation may admit that there might be modest  "set-up"
costs associated with  marshalling and organizing  to shift operations to a point
within the set that is different from what the firm currently is doing, and
that some adjustments (another  form of set-up cost) might be required to get
the new choice operating smoothly, although these shift costs are  generally
repressed in the  formal modeling.  However, it  seems inconsistent with  the
"operating  within the production set" idea if the set up costs for shifting to
a new point involved doing a lot of exploratory "search and study" to identify
and get a better feel for alternatives  that, up to then, had been unfamiliar to
the firm, and the "adjustment"  involved  a lot of trial-error-try  again learning
by  doing and using. At  least it would  seem inconsistent if  the results of
searching and learning were highly uncertain,  both to the firm ex ante, and to
an economist  trying to predict  what the results  would be.
Of course, a plausible interpretation of the production set idea might
admit a certain amount of statistical  uncertainty  regarding inputs and outputs,
particularly  if  there  were  unknowable outside  forces,  like  the  amount  of
rainfall, that bear on the process.  But if the decision  maker in question has
only very rough ideas about the consequences of trying to do something, and
initially about how to do it, that something does not seem to be an activity
that  can  be  regarded  as  within  the  unit's  production  choice  set.  The
production set of a firm would appear to be limited at any time to those things
the firm knows about and knows how to do, with good confidence and skill.  Or
at least  that is how economists  implicitly  define the concept.
On the other hand, a move that involves  a lot of study of initially hazy
alternatives, or research and development where even the nature of the outcome
is not clear in advance, would, according to these criteria,  be regarded as a
"technological"  change or "innovation"  for the firm in question.  We do not see
how such a move possibly can be regarded as one "along  a prevailing production
function," if economists adhere to what they teach about the meaning of choice
sets.
We call attention to the fact that, under the way we are proposing the
distinction be  drawn,  a  firm's production set  in principle  could  be  very
extensive.  Indeed,  much of what some versions of the new neoclassical growth
13_heory treat as "technological  advance" would, under the principles suggested
nere, be regarded as moves along a firm's prevai:Ling  production function.  In
_hese  models (see  e.g. Romer, 1990) investments  in R & D are strictly  up-front
costs required to make a product or technique  operational.  But in these models
(if  not in fact) R & D is strictly a set up cost to make an activity the firm
always knew about available for use.  There are  no Knightian uncertainties
involved.
However,  once  we  get  away  from  particular  abstract  models,  most
economists who  have studied the  processes empirically understand  that  the
_.troduction to the economy  of products or processes significantly different
-rom any  employed before  does  not  look  like  a  move  "along  a  prevailing
oroduction  function."  It  is  well  documented  empirically  that,  while
zheoretical engineering calculations at  any  time encompass a  wide  range  of
techniques not  yet  brought  to  practice, the  bringing  to  practice  of  new
_echnology  invariably involves "up front" research and development costs, with
Knightian uncertainties at least early in the process.  (See e.g. Nelson and
Winter, 1982, and Rosenberg, 1994).  While R and D can resolve some of these
uncertainties, there  are uncertainties  in the R and D process itself.  Further,
even after R and D, there almost always are "bugs" at the start of operation,
and  it  usually  takes  some  time  before  the  operation  is  really  got  under
control.  In many cases the attempts  at innovating  prove unprofitable, and need
to be abandoned, or radically  revised.
Of course, in this paper we are dealing with the adoption of technologies
_hat, while new to the firm or country, are not new to the world.  The issue,
then, is whether such changes in the behavior anci  performance of firms in the
nics can meaningfully be explained  as changed choices within largely unchanging
choice sets.
The accumulationists clearly have in mind that, if a  technology is in
effective use in one country, there are ways that firms in other countries can
use  to  take  aboard  that  technology  at  relatively  low  cost,  and  without
significant uncertainties  regarding the outcome of their efforts.  Quite often
detailed descriptions  are available.  One can hire consultants who are familiar
with the practices involved.  In many cases one can get assistance from the
firms who  are operating the technology, although some license  fees may  be
required.
The  assimilationist, in  contrast, is  skeptical about easy  "technology
.ransfer".  To be sure, for  many of the technologies  that the firms in the nics
adopted there were available engineering  texts and articles and the like. Blue
14prints and  specific handbooks often could be  obtained.  There are  lots  of
consultants  for hire.
However, the assimilationist would stress that such a move  invariably
involves not only "up front"  costs of identifying,  learning about, and learning
to master the technique in question, but also significant uncertainties.  The
range  of  options  is  hazy.  Things  often  do  not  work  out  as  expected.
Consultants  seldom  can  guarantee  success.  Inevitably  there  is  a  lot  of
learning  by doing and using.  The costs,  and the uncertainties, are greater the
farther  the  technique being  adopted  is  from  those  the  firm  actually  has
employed.  in many cases major changes in firm organization may be required.
The firm may  need to learn to sense new  markets.  Firms attempting these
changes  can  and  often  do  fail.  Those  that  succeed  do  so  because  they
successfully learn to do things they simply could not do before. That is, they
succeed  by expanding  their production sets.
IV  What  Does  the  Evidence  Indicate  ?
We can return now to the question of what kind of evidence one would need
to determine whether an observed change was within a prevailing capability or
choice set, or required an expansion of the set of things the organizations in
question knew how to do.  The prior section argued that the standard data and
techniques for deciding simply do not do the job.  We propose here that the
kind of evidence that can be most persuasive involves examination of process,
not simply time paths of inputs and outputs, and that such data are to be found
at a quite low level of aggregation.
However, we believe that, if one has the issues that divide the theories
firmly in mind,  aat least some relevant evidence can be  gleaned  from more
aggregate  statistical  analysis.  Thus  we  have  proposed  that,  for  an
accumulationist, the  relationship between a  country's growth of  output per
worker and its investments  per worker is determined  by the set of technological
alternatives "out there",  which define its available production function. There
would seem to be a presumption that this production function is the same for
all countries, or at least some argument  is needed if one is to propose that it
is  not.  On  the  other  hand,  for an  assimilationist, the  relationship  is
determined, to a considerable  degree, by the skill of the firms in a nation in
searching and learning, capabilities that certainly can differ widely across
nations. For an accumulationist,  any significant  variation among countries from
15a fitted cross country "production function" is something of.  a bother, and a
ouzzle  to  be  explained.  But  an  assimilationist  would  expect  to  find
considerable  variation. Further,  the assimilationist's  argument regarding Korea
and  Taiwan,China would  imply that these  countries achieved a  significantly
greater  increase in output  per worker than  most other countries  with comparable
initial  conditions,  and comparably  high investment  rates.
Much  of  the  analysis of  the performance of  the  Asian  countries  has
emphasized the absolute performance of the countries themselves, particularly
as measured by  total factor productivity growth and  factor accumulation. To
derive  measures  of  performance  or  to  interpret  such  measures,  strong
assumptions,  which we have questioned,  are made about the production function.
Another  measure  of  performance which  is  eclectic  rather  than  based  on  a
specific  production  theoretic  base  is  the  estimation  of  cross  country
regressions  of  the type used by Barro, 1991, and Mankiw, Romer,and Weil, 1992,3
which permit  comparison of  a  given country's performance relative to  other
nations.  To  see  whether  the performance of  the  two  countries  of  greatest
interest, here  Korea and Taiwan,China, is unusual, we  employ the  following
estimated  cross  country  regression  equation  to  explain  differences  in
international  rates of growth  of GDP per capita,
4
GDPG =  -.0046 -.0308RGDP60 +.0296P60 -.0526GPOP +  .0639i  (1)
where GDPG is the growth rate of per capita GDP, RGDP60 is GDP relative to the
U.S. in 1960, P60 is primary school enrollment in 1960 as a percentage of the
relevant  age group, GPOP is the growth rate of the population from 1960-85, and
i is the average investent/GDP ratio in 1960-85. The variable i is a proxy
measure for the rate of growth of the capital stock, K  =  AK/K  =  iGDP/K.  Even
if  there  is  substantial variation in  initial capital-output ratios,  GDP/K,
differences in the value of i over 25 years will outweigh such dispersion and
yield a good approximation  to KW.
These  regressions were developed to  test whether the  standard  Solow-Swan
neoclassical  model can explain cross country performance  better than endogenous
growth models. However, these models do not  invoke strong assumptions about
technical change and factor market pricing that is necessary in estimating TFP
growth within a country over time. For a useful evaluation of this literature
see Crofts, 1991.
16Figure 2 graphs actual minus  predicted GDP growth per capita against i
for countries in our sample that had high investment rates, i >  20 percent. As
can be seen there is an insignificant negative relation between i and actual
minus  predicted growth. But among the  high investment countries, the  Asian
nics, and Korea and Taiwan,China  in particular stand out as unusual performers,
even after adjusting for the other variables on the right hand side of  (1)
including the potential benefits of being laggards. Table 3 shows the actual
minus predicted growth rates of a number of countries with very high values of
i.  Compared with nations such as Greece, Portugal,  and Spain, Korea and Taiwan,
China  have  unusual performance.  It  is  clear  that high  physical  investment
ratios and initial conditions that are thought to be  conducive to growth are
not sufficient,  alone, to explain  the Korean  or Taiwanese  cases.
There  is a  large literature which  adds additional variables to  those
included  in  equation  1  including  some  measuring  macroeconomic  management,
export orientation, and so on. While such variables are of interest, they do
not provide information about the nature of the production performance or the
basis of success of economies in absorbing large quantitities of factor inputs
while others obtained low returns. Our contention is that a critical element
was the technological  efforts of firms in Korea and Taiwan,China which allowed
them to successfully initiate new industries and absorb new equipment. While
other countries  with high I/GDP ratios could purchase  machinery which gave them
the potential to improve their productivity,  this could only be successful when
it was combined with domestic effort to absorb the new technology. Moreover,
much  of the  successful absorption effort is not attributable to  formal and
measureable R  &  D  but  efforts of  firms to  learn about  new  opportunities,
improve  organization  and  inventory  management,  and  undertake  minor  but
cumulatively significant changes in the production process. While proxies for
such  activity  could  be  introduced  in  cross  country  estimates,  their
construction is tenuous and would lead to  false concreteness. 50n the  other
hand,  case  studies  which  are  considered later,  despite  the  difficulty  of
generalization,  are suggestive  and provide important insights into the origins
of the exceptional  growth  shown in Figure  2 and Table 3.
4  This equation is found in Pack and Page (1994).  For a review of much of the
literature  see Levine  and Renelt, 1992.
S  For cautions, usually disregarded, about data  reliability, see  Heston and
Summers, 1991.
17A major problem  with highly aggregated economic  data is that it masks the
magnitude and even the nature of the  allocational changes going on.  Thus,
earlier we noted that in  the 1990's Korean and Taiwanese manufacturing firms
were heavily engaged in producing products that in the 1960's they were not
producing at all. This is strikingly illustrated  by Table 4 for Taiwan,China.
In particular, note Taiwan's production of electronic goods, which by the late
1980s  were  accounting  for  roughly  21  percent  of  Taiwanese  manufacturing
exports.  In 1960 virtually  no electronics  goods were produced in Taiwan,China.
In both Korea and Taiwan,China, a considerable amount of the knowledge came
from OECD purchasers of exports  (Westphal, Kim, Dahlman 1985, Hou  and San,
1993). The transfer of  such information to local firms by importers desiring
lower cost, higher  quality products  is an  important  feature of  Korean  and
Taiwanese  experience.  But  as  Hobday  (1995), Kim  (forthcoming),  Pack  and
Westphal, (1997)  and others report in their detailed firm histories, summarized
below, this information was only the initial foundation upon which firms then
built their technological  capacity, first learning rudimentary  processing, then
improving their productivity in  small ways, then engaging in  innovations in
process engineering and product design. While  some of  the  foundations were
acquired from importers, the structure was  mainly constructed through intense
efforts on the part of firms.
At  a  slightly  higher  level  of  aggregation  the  rapid  sectoral
transformation in  both  Korea  and  Taiwan,China is  shown  in  Table  5.  Labor
intensive, technologically simple sectors such as food processing, textiles,
and  clothing  experienced a  relative  decline  while  capital  and  technology
intensive  sectors such as chemicals,  metal products,  machinery, and electronics
expanded. It is difficult  to articulate what it would mean to say that capital
and labor  were allocated to these sectors  and were routinely incorporated in an
existing well understood production function.  To the contrary, there was a
widespread perception in both countries that the technological competence of
firms initially was insufficient  to undertake efficient expansion in the newer
sectors. In a more formal  way, the appendix sets out a model which describes a
growth pattern  in which  "craft"  firms with  lower profitability  decline  in
relative importance while "advanced" firms expand. The two sets of firms have
different production  parameters and  the  aggregate process  of  growth  which
mimics that of a neoclassical process cannot be described as a movement along
an international  production function.
18Within such a world the allocation of activity within the manufacturing
sector  almost  certainly would  be  associated with  considerable  turnover  of
fi-ms,  with firms  going out of business in the declining sectors, and new firms
entering the expanding fields. Such a change in the allocation of  activity
within  the  manufacturing sector  almost  certainly would  be  associated  with
considerable turnover  of  firms,  with  firms  going  out  of  business  in  the
declining sectors, and new firms entering the expanding fields.  And within the
expanding areas one would expect to see a certain amount of turnover as some
firms try and fail  while others succeed.  Unfortunately,  we do not have the firm
turnover data that is directly  relevant to the phenomena  we are characterizing.
However, there are data on the number of firms of  different sizes  in
Korea and  Taiwan,China for  several years, and  a  summary of  these  data  is
presented in Table 6.  The pattern is roughly what one would expect under the
assimilationist's story. There has been a striking decline in the number of
very small firms, most of which very likely were locked into old technologies
and producing traditional products, and a sharp rise in the number of middle
size or larger firms;  we conjecture  that a large share of these were new firms
entering the new product fields or older firms that succeeded in taking on
board modern technology.  In the early 1970s the productivity of these larger
firms  was strikingly  higher than that of the small firms that, according to the
story we are proposing,  they were replacing.
However, to get at the details of what was going on would seem to require
stuudying  individual firms.  Only by studying firms can one see just what was
involved  when they came to master new technologies  and learn what was needed to
operate in new product fields.  As noted above there have been a large number of
detailed studies of Taiwanese and Korean manufacturing firms, tracing  the
sources of  the  firms' rapidly growing range  of manufacturing competencies.
While  a  skeptic may  argue  these are  anecdotal, the  evidence  from  several
hundred  firm  interviews can  be  regarded  as  no  less  compelling  than  the
imperfect aggregate data which are employed to  argue that there was limited
technical  change.
For example, a typical description of the production processes in the
Korean engineering industries in the mid to late 1970s is enlightening.  As
shown in Table 5, this sector grew enormously during the last three decades
and became Korea's largest single sector. Yet as late as 1977, its production
processes were described as exceptionally backward not primarily in the type
of equipment utilized but  in the organization of production. The  following
observations were  given by  a  group of  engineers  and economists  describing
19Korean machine producing plants as of 1977, fifteen years after Korea's major
effort at industrialization had begun.
The  common  pattern was  one  of  machine placement  that  is
haphazard rather than allowing for an orderly flow of work.  Floor
space is very crowded and the operation of machining, fabrication
of components, assembly of parts, are scattered in any place that
happens to have available room.  Too much time is spent finding
work, or the next job, or material.  In some cases the men have to
find their own area in which to work, perhaps make up some form of
fixtures of  their own,  or  find the  means  to  obtain  levels  or
measurements to work from.  The almost universal characteristic is
one of congestion and a mixing of operations  that frequently leads
to deterioration of  quality because of  improper floor planning.
There is no adequate provision for working space around the main
machines and the aisleways that  are normally  used to carry the flow
of work are completely  congested  with work-in  process. 7
Yet fifteen years later these plants were producing high quality machine
tools  for  export. The deficiencies described were  amenable to  improvements
through learning better practice and significant reorganization  While  it  is
possible  to  make  such  learning  tautologically equal  to  moving  along  an
international  production function,  it  was costly, the results uncertain,  and
it took place over many years, suggesting a much mTore  complex phenomenon, not
replicated  in many other countries  in which capital  accumulation  was rapid.
The firm histories provide details of a conmplex  interactive process in
which  OECD  importers furnished some  knowledge of  production engineering  to
facilitate  production  in low cost firms.  As these firms improved their cost and
quality structure,  the importers  provided specifications  for new products which
the  local  firms manufactured as original equipment manufacturers  (OEM). To
maintain their contracts they were  forced to constantly reduce cost through
improving  productivity.  The  OEM  process  thus  provided  a  strong  learning
environment  in which  firms not  able to  continue to meet  quality  and  cost
specifications in  short term  opportunistic relationships could  easily  lose
their markets.  To quote from a case study of an internationally known Taiwanese
computer peripherals  supplier:
Foreign  buyers  are  an  important  source  of  technological
enhancement. Their rigorous specifications  are seen as a challenge
for  the  firm  to  meet.  Equipped  with  different  viewpoints  and
accumulated  experience,  they criticize  a lot and suggest other ways
of doing things.  Although they do not provide exact blue prints,
'  The  World  Bank, 1979. While the production processs described  could  be
interpreted as a cost minimizing response to the relative cost of  labor and
space, the engineers observed that the same amount of space could have been
reorganized in order to achieve a much better flow.
20their suggestions are invaluable in upgrading the technology level
of the firm. Still, our own R & D is the most important source of
technology.  Without this capability,  the firm would not be able to
evaluaze  research proposals, technology contracts,  licenses,  or
buyers' suggestions. (Pack,  Wang, and Westphal, 1996)
Thus, while some knowledge was  readily obtained from the rest  of  the
world, as the accumulationists correctly argue, this view is a partial  one.
Rather  the  -ransfers provided the  skeleton upon  which  the  flesh  of  major
industrial prowess was built. Firm histories suggest that when transfers did
occur, they were followed  by internal learning and innovative efforts.  The R &
D figures and patent statistics  shown in Table 7 for Taiwan,China provide one
measure of the large formal domestic research effort which built upon imported
knowledge. Be:ween 1981 and 1991 the number of patents granted to Taiwanese
nationals  quadrupled,  being  roughly  equal  to  foreign  patents  in  1991.
Similarly, formal R  &  D  spending increased from  .5 to  2  percent  of  GDP.
Moreover,  fornal R  &  D  is  likely to  constitute a  minor  part  of  domestic
technological  effort.
Amsden  (1989)  provides a history of a Korean textile firm's learning. It
commenced production in 1963 and most of the additions to the plant occurred
before  1977. The machinery was purchased  from Belgium, England, Japan,  and
Germany and the firm received technical assistance from its suppliers. Labor
productivity shown in Table 8 improved  substantially  between 1977 and 1986 with
basically  unc:anged  quantities of  machinery  in  both  spinning  and  weaving.
Output per  unit of  equipment improved as weJl  in spinning and  was  roughly
constant in weaving. The firm employed a large group of textile engineers to
achieve  this improvement  in productivity.  Two observations  based on the data in
Table  8 are relevant for our purposes. First, there was a steady increase in
output  per  unit  of  labor  after  the  equipment was  installed  and  this  is
explicitly  attributable to  the  firm's  effort  to  improve  its  performance.
Second, the last row in the table shows the output per unit of input relative
to international  best practice in British plants. Twenty five years after its
establishment and after a considerable  period of learning, the firm was still
not operating at international  best practice, a result hardly consistent with
the  view  that  firms  in  the  NICs  moved  along  an  international production
function.
The second example,  also provided by Amsden, concerns  the Pohang Iron and
Steel Company, generally known as POSCO. Although it initiated production with
imported equipment and with considerable technical assistance from abroad, it
21too engaged in intensive internal effort to augment its productivity. It did
not simply  move instantaneously  to international  productivity  levels.
To improve  the performance of each piece of equipment, POSCO
orovided  training  to  its  workers.  ...  Between  1968  and  1979
training courses of one form or another involved roughly 61,4000
workers.  Approximately  4,200  people  were  trained  outside  the
company, 1,513 overseas. In 1984 alone, 9,900 workers had received
training, some 1,000 of them in computer applications. POSCO also
runs technical training schools in the town of Pohang, and in 1984
established an engineering college that it hopes will evolve along
the lines of  MIT. (Amsden,  1989,  pp. 305-306.
While  the  improved  general level  of  education  for  the  labor  force  was  a
precondition for such training to be productive, it is no guarantor of such
effort by firms. Case studies in other countries  of firms with relatively high
levels  of educated  labor do not uncover  such evidence of systematic  training.  8
For our purposes, one of the most interesting set of  firm studies are
those undertaken by Michael Hobday (1995)  of Korean and Taiwanese electronics
companies.  Hobday describes in detail how these firms started out, usually
producing  quite  simple products,  and  then  progressively moved  on  to  more
complex ones.  In most of the  cases he  studied, these new complex products
first  were made to order for their foreign customers who, in the early stages,
provided detailed engineering  instructions  and assistance.  Gradually, however,
many of these companies came to be able to do their own design work.  In a
number of  cases, recently they have moved on to sell under their own brand
label.  Throughout the  history of  these  firms, one  can  see  them  actively
working to learn to do the things they were doing better, and to be able to do
more sophisticated and profitable things.  In the early stages, this learning
involved reverse engineering.  As the companies began to do their own design
work, this engineering effort began to be counted as research and development.
He  summarizes  55  firm  case  studies  in  Hong  Kong,  Korea,  Singapore  and
Taiwan,China  as follows:
East Asian latecomers did not leapfrog from one vintage of
technology to another. On the contrary, the  evidence shows that
firms  engaged  in  a  painstaking  and  cumulative  process  of
technological learning: a hard slog rather than a leapfrog. The
route  to  advanced  electronics  and  information  technology  was
through  a  long  difficult  *  learning  process,  driven  by  the
manufacture of electronics  goods for  export. (p.  1188).
See, for example, the detailed firm studies in India in Lall,  1987.
22Linsu Kim  (forthcoming)  provides a set of analyses of Korean firms, in
several  different  industries,  that  show  much  the  same  phenomena  as  does
Hcbday's  study.  The  firms  started  out  using  relatively  unsophisticated
technologies  and  learned,  over  the  years,  progressively  to  master  more
soohisticated ones.  By  the 1990s many  of these firms were approaching the
technological frontier.  But the paths they took were not simple, and success
never was guaranteed.
The  story about the development of Korean and Taiwanese firms told by
:nsden, Hobday, and Kim, is strikingly  similar  to that told by Odagiri and Goto
(forthcoming)  in their study of how Japanese  industry learned about and learned
to  master  the  technologies of  the  West  in  the  years  between  the  Meiji
restoration and the advent of World War II.  They find that a major amount of
searching,  exploring,  trying,  failing,  and  learning  was  required  before
Japanese  firms  acquired proficiency in  the  western  technologies  they  were
adopting and adapting.  The decisions of firm  managers to get into the new ways
involved major uncertainties.  Odagiri and Goto stress their "entrepreneurial"
nature, and the innovation and learning that were involved.  Our argument is
that Korean and Taiwanese firms went through much the same process, half  a
century later.
To  return to  our basic  analytic argument, we  do  not  think  that  the
industrial development of Korea and Taiwan,China since the 1950's, or of Japan
a half century earlier (see Saxonhouse, 1974) can be interpreted as  "moving
along production functions," at least if that term connotes changing choices
within a largely unchanging choice set.  On the other hand, if the kind of
entrepreneurship, innovation,  and learning  on the part of firms revealed in the
case studies is considered  as perfectly consistent  with  the notion of "moving
along a production function,"  we do not know what that concept would exclude,
and hence it becomes  meaningless.
V.  Do  the  Differences  Matter,  and  If  So,  How?
The differences between the two theories would appear to matter for two
different reasons.  The first is, simply, regarding how one understands what
happened.  What lies behind the Asian miracle?  The second is that the two
theories might imply somewhat different things regarding appropriate economic
development policy.  What kinds  of government  policies are helpful, and what are
the lessons for other countries?
It  is  apparent  that,  for  many  economists,  one  of  the  strongest
attractions of the accumulation  theory is that it is clean and simple, and its
23basic outlines con_orm with the general theory about economic activity that
ones  finds  in  modern  economic  text  books.  It  is  at  once  delightfully
iconoclastic, and comfortably conservative, to take the miraculous out of the
Asian miracle by proposing that it all was a simple matter of moving along a
production function.  No appeal is needed to the idea of entrepreneurship or
innovation, the  sources of which might  very well lie outside the  effective
province of neoclassical  economics.
It also is clear that a major source of resistance to the assimilation
theory is that it seems a complex theory which raises as many questions as it
answers. This raises suspicions that the assimilation theory cannot be cleanly
formulated.  It is a comfort, therefore, that a simpler,  more familiar theory
seems  capable of providing  all the explanation  that is needed.
And yet, what is at odds intellectually  may be only a small part of the
corpus  of  traditional economic  theory.  More,  that  particular part,  which
proposes that production sets can be sharply  defined, and that there is a clear
distinction  between  moving  along  the  production  function  and  having  the
production function shift, came into economics only a relatively short time
ago.  Perhaps these particular conceptions are not  needed  for most  standard
economic arguments, and maybe they have been accepted too uncritically in any
case.
A  strong argument can be made that the assimilationists'  perspective is
auite  consistent with  an older  set of  ideas in  economics.  The  idea that
economic growth can be explained  by increases  in the factors of production, and
also by improvements  .in  their productivity, goes back at least as far as John
Stuart Mill.  However, a striking feature of the earlier analyses of economic
growth, as contrasted  with the more contemporary treatments, is that there was
no  compulsion  to  separate  sharply  between  the  contributions of  different
sources of  growth.  For Adam  Smith, increases in the  size of  the  market,
invention of  better  ways  of  performing a  task,  growing mechanization,  and
changing organization  of work, all go together.  They would seem to also do so
in Mill.  The early post World War II growth accountants, in particular Moses
Abramowitz,  also stressed the  interaction of technological advance, growing
physical  capital  intensity of  production, increasing exploitation  of  scale
economies, rising educational attainments, and changes in the organization of
production, as  factors behind experienced economic growth.  The question of
which of these factors should be  interpreted as moving  the economy along a
production function and which should be regarded as shifting it seems not to
have been of major concern to these authors.
24In Section II we argued that standard techniques do not permit one to
separate sharply between  movements along and shifts in the production function.
Now we would like to argue  that the very notion that one can make such sharp
splits, even in principle,  may not be a useful theoretical  premise.
In particular, we would like to argue that "innovation"  in practice is a
matter of degree, not kind, and that our growth theory ought to recognize this
explicitly.  For  any  firm  or  organization  at  any  time,  there  are  some
activities that are under practiced control, some that are not at present but
seem easy to learn, others harder, others presently impossible  but perhaps with
research and experimentation achievable over the long run.  The problem with
now  standard  production  theory  is  that  it  does  not  recognize  these
continuities, but  rather presumes a  sharp cliff between  the  known and  the
unknown.
The case studies of  firms, briefly discussed in Section IV, show them
moving from the known, to the unknown, but cautiously, and drawing from the
known as much as they can.  Yesterday's  unknown becomes today's known, and the
firms  venture  further.  An  effective  theory  of  what  has  been  happening
requires, we believe, abandonment of the notion that production sets at any
time are sharply defined, and thus that there is  a clear distinction between
moving to another  perceived point and innovation.  Rather, there is a continuum.
If one explicitly  recognizes  that that distinction is in fact fuzzy, does
not that mean  one has  a  fuzzy theory?  Not at  all.  One  of  the  striking
features of the various "evolutionary  models" of economic growth that have been
built over the last decade is that, within them, innovation is treated as a
matter of degree, firms move step by step into the unknown, and in so doing
seldom  move very far from  the known.
Abandoning  the  sharp  distinction  between  moving  along  a  production
function and innovation  clearly is a big step analytically.  Such a step would
involve placing  learning and  adaptation at  center  stage  of  the  behavioral
analysis, and letting go of analytic techniques and arguments  that presume that
"profit  maximization" is something that managers actually are able to achieve,
rather that something they strive for intelligently.  Yet it is arguable that
most of the important and useful propositions about the role of markets  and
competition  depend on the latter  not the former.
The notion that competition  tends to force price down towards costs, and
to stimulate reform or elimination of high cost producers, goes far back  in
economics.  The argument does not depend on the existence of sharply defined
production sets, or the achievement  by firms  of policies that actually maximize
25profits, given the  full set of theoretical alternatives.  It is intelligent
striving that does the job.  Similarly, the argument that a change in factor
prices will induce behavior that economizes on the factor whose cost has risen
does  not  require  either  sharply  defined  production  functions  or  actual
maximization, but only intelligent  striving.
What  are  the  policy  implications  of  taking  an  assimilationist,  or
evolutionary, view  on  what happened in  the Asian miracle?  Are  the policy
prescriptions  fundamentally different  under  an  assimilationist theory  than
under an accumulationist  theory?  In  many ways the policy prescriptions in fact
are quite similar, although  the reasons  behind the arguments  differ somewhat.
Both neoclassical  and assimilationist  theories put considerable  weight on
investments in human capital.  By stressing the importance of innovation and
learning, and  the  role  of  an  educated work  force  in  these processes,  the
assimilationist might push even harder on the education front than  would a
modern neoclassical economist.
No  disagreement either  on  the  importance  of  investment  in  physical
capital.  However  the  assimilationist  would  highlight  the  role  of  such
investments  as a vehicle for taking aboard more modern technologies,  and stress
that  if  capital formation is  not  linked to  effective entrepreneurship, the
returns to investment almost surely will diminish greatly after a point.  On
the other hand the assimilationist  would point to effective entrepreneurship as
a key vehicle for keeping investment rates of return high, and would put less
emphasis on simply trying  to lift up the savings  rate.
Both theories stress the importance  of exporting.  However, here too the
reasons for the  emphasis are  somewhat different.  The assimilationist sees
exporting as an extremely important vehicle for learning, as well as a way of
exploiting evolving comparative advantage.  Thus,  the  assimilation theorist
might be even stronger on the importance of exporting, and willing to bias the
incentive  system to induce firms to try to export.
Both  theories stress the essential role of private  enterprise, profit
incentives, and an environment that stimulates  managers to make decisions that
enhance economic development.  A neoclassicalist would focus on getting the
prices  right  and  making  necessary public  infrastructure investments.  The
assimilationist would  take  a  somewhat more  complex  view  on  both  of  these
matters. In particular, an assimilationist  might stress the role of government
funding and organization in building up national scientific and technological
infrastructure from which firms can draw assistance.  But under both theories,
26i  is the energy of private enterprise that is key, and under both there is
deep skepticism  about the value of detailed  government  planning.
Both neoclassical and evolutionary  theorists stress the great importance
of  competition.  However  here  too  the  reasons  differ  somewhat,  with  the
proponent of  evolutionary theory pushing competition especially in  contexts
wnere  innovation  is  both  important and  risky.  From  this  point  of  view,
competition is  valuable largely because  choice sets are not  clear or  not
clearly defined and it is highly valuable, therefore, to get a lot of things
zried.
So,  the policy differences between the  theories may  be  significantly
smaller than the  conceptual or analytic differences.  This  should not be  a
surprise.  Economists were stressing the importance of profit incentives, and
competition, and the dangers of government  planning, long before the idea of a
sharply defined production set  came into vogue.  Indeed, one can find these
basic arguments in Adam Smith's  Wealth of Nations.
27Appendix:  A Simple Evolutionary  Model
The model we offer here is totally devoid of substitution possibilities
within a  given  technology. Rather, all  development takes place  through  the
shifting  of  resources  from  one  technology, which  we  will  call  craft,  to
another,  which we will call modern.  That is, "assimilation"  is what is driving
development  here.  Yet  the growth pattern  it generates could be interpreted  by
a growth accountant or a fitter of dynamic production functions as indicating
that "accumulation"  was the basic story.  Expansion of physical and educational
capital per worker is an essential part of the process by which the economy
incorporates  modern technology into its productive structure. But, on the other
hand, accumulation  without assimilation  yields  no returns.
Within this model a basic constraint on the rate of assimilation is the
effectiveness of  entrepreneurship. There  always  are profits  to  be  made  by
expanding the modern sector. The strength of entrepreneurship  in responding to
profit opportunities determines the rate at which this happens. This response
can  be  encouraged  by  a  favorable  policy  climate.  Moroever,  a  strong
entrepreneurial response may, if successful, generate still more latitude for
the  government  to  pursue  additional desirable policies.  We  believe  this
interaction accurately depicts an essential ingredient of the "Asian Miracle".
The rapid expansion  of human capital, another  essen,tial  ingredient  in our view,
also  plays  a  central  role  in  this model,  being  necessary  for  the  rapid
expansion  of the modern sector.
The model does not contain a third ingredient that we consider central;
-he rapid learning that took place in a firm after modern technology was first
adopted.  The model assumes in effect that such learning  took place instantly
and was once and for all, while in fact the firms  moved progressively into more
and more  complex technologies. Here we  choose to keep the model  simple and
abstract from the cumulative  natUre of learning.
Assume that there are two different kinds of fixed proportions constant
returns to  scale technologies, which we  will denote c  for craft and m  for
modern.  Capital per unit of output is the same iLn  the two technologies but
output per unit of labor is higher in the modern sector than the craft.  So
also,  then, is capital per unit of labor. If factor prices in the two sectors
were the same, unit costs using modern techniques would be  lower than costs
using craft technology. However, the modern sector requires "educated" labor
while education  is not necessary  or productive  in craft  technology.
28At the start of the development  traverse almost all of capital and labor
is in the craft sector.  However  we assume that there is a tiny amount in the
modern sector which serves, in effect, to "seed" .he development process.  At
any time output  per input  per unit of labor input in the economy or industry as
a  whole  will  be  the  weighted  average  of  labor  productivity  in  the  two
technologies,  the weights being the proportion  of labor employed by each of the
technologies..  Let a,  be output per unit of labor in craft technology and am =
output  per unit of labor in modern technology,  with ac<am.  Then:
Q/L =  amLmIL  +  actL/L  (la)
Q/L  =  a,  +  (am  -ac)L:/L  (lb)
As  Lm/L grows over the development process, so does Q/L.  Since capital per
unit  of  output  is  the  same  in  the  two  sectors,  an  increase  in  L  /L  is
accompanied by a rise in K/L. Indeed, within this model Q/L and K/L  grow at
the same rate.
Within our model a shift in the proportions  of capital in the two sectors
drives development.  We  assume that the  price of  the  product  is  the  same
whether it is produced by modern or craft technology, and  is constant over
time. The latter can be rationalized  by presuming that the product is sold on
world markets and hence is  insensitive to  the quantity produced within  the
particular economy in question.  We also assume that the cost of capital is the
same in the two sectors.  This means that differences in labor cost is the only
factor that affects the relative profitabilities of the two technologies.  We
could modify these assumptions, but making them enables us to tell a cleaner
story.
Let w be the price of labor in the craft sector, and gw its price in the
modern  sector, with  g>l.  Thus  g  (for graduation) reflects an  education
premium.  We assume, however, that g never is so large as to completely offset
the productivity  advantages  of modern technology.
If  one  uses  a  prime  over  a  symbol  to  denote  an  inverse,  then  the
difference  between the two sectors in cost, and profit, per unit of output, and
capital,  can be written:
AC =  w(a',  -ga'm)  (2)
The  higher  profitability  of  modern  technology  than  craft  provides
29incentive  to shift resources from the latter to the former.  Within this model
the  strength  of  the  response  is  determined  by  the  effectiveness  of
entrepreneurship,  denoted  by e.
d/dt (log  Km/Kc)  =ew(a', -ga'm)  (3)
d/dt(log  Km/K)  =ew(a',  -ga'm)  (1  -Km/K)  (4)
If w and g are constants,  the time path of K<m/K  (and  Qm/Q)  will  trace out
a  logistic function. L,/L will  be  increasing as these  variables  grow,  but
lagging behind  them.  Of course in  the limit they all  approach one.  Tf w
increases as development proceeds but  not g,  the  rate of  expansion of  the
modern sector relative to the craft will be accelerated reflecting that, since
modern technology saves on labor, an increased w increases its cost advantage.
An increase in the education premiun, g, over the development trajectory will
diminish the cost advantage of modern technology.  On the other hand a decline
in g, say as educated  labor  becomes more plentiful,  will enhance it.
We know from equations la and lb that, as capital and labor shift to the
modern sector, K/L and Q/L will increase.  If the amount of educated labor is
responsive to  demand,  human capital also  will be  increasing. An  economist
looking at aggregate data likely would conclude that growth of Q/L was caused
by the growth of physical and human capital per worker (and  indeed such growth
of capital was required for growth) and would argue that growth  basically was
due  to  "movements  along  the  (economy-wide) production  function".  This
"exolanation" would repress two things.  First, the force driving growth was
the progressive adoption  of modern technology,  a technology  virtually absent in
the economy before development began. And second, while the profitability of
employing modern technology was motivating the shift, the rate at which  the
modern  sector replaces the  craft was being  determined  by  the  strength  of
entrepreneurship.  On the other hand, the traditional analysis would be right
about the rate of growth  of human capital  being an enabling factor.
Thus consider two economies with exactly the same initial conditions,
facing exactly the same opportunities to adopt modern technology, and having
the  same  input  supply  elasticities.  In  one  the  response  to  profit
opportunities, e, is high, and in the other low.  The expansion of the modern
sector, the growth of physical capital intensity, increases in human capital,
and the advance of labor productivity,  all would be faster in the former than
the latter. An economist, thinking in terms of production functions, would try
to explain the differences in terms of different rates of "accumulation", but
30he key factor behind the scenes would be differences in the entrepreneurlal
resonse  to profit opportunities. 9
Behind the  scenes in the model growth of human  capitaL is  a enabling
element.  Other things being equal, a high e  (resulting  in rapid growth of the
.. odern  sector)  will cause a rapid increase  in the demand for educated labor. If
_ncreased supply  is not  forthcoming at the prevailing premium  for educated
Labor,  under various ways of modeling the dynamics g will rise.  This will slow
town the rate of growth of the modern sector associated  with a given e.  On the
other hand,  a  rapid expansion of  the  educated work  force  can  be  absorbed
roductively  only if e is high.
Just as, within this model, a high e tends to draw forth expansion of
.. uiman  capital, a high e tends to generate high profits in the industry as a
;hole, and hence a  source of  the savings to  finance the  investment in  the
-odern  sector.  Both  effects  are  of  course  moderated  by  "supply  side'
-ariables. To  keep  this  presentation  simple we  have  not  introduced  these
explicitly  into this model.
Within this model, development is a process driven by a disequilibrium.
-he disequilibrium, and the rate at which it is eliminated, shows up in this
.- odel in the behavior of capital's share  over the development traverse. Set the
constant product price as the mumeraire.  Then the share of capital in total
:ncome  is:
Sk =  (1  - wa'c)Qc/Q +  (1  -gwa'm)Q,\Q  (5a)
Sk  =  (1  -waec)  +  w(a',  -ga>)QQ,/Q  (5b)
he  first term of 5b is capital's  share in the craft sector. The second term is
... e amount by which capital's share in the modern sector exceeds it's share in
-he  craft, times the relative size  of the  modern sector.
Let b be the common capital output ratio in the two sectors, and r the
eauilibrium rate  of  return  on  capital.  Assume  that  at  the  start  of  thM
development  traverse the craft sector is in equilibrium.  Then while capital'e
share in the modern sector is greater than  br, since Qm/Q  is very  small the
share of total capital in the total industry  is close to br at the start of tho
zraverse.  We also assume that as development proceeds and the modern sector
- A  considerable  literature attests  to  these  differences  among  developing
countries. Contrast, for example, Lall's (1987)  description of the behavior of
ndian firms with those of Hobday (1996)  and Kim (forthcoming)  of the efforts
of  Korean  and  Taiwanese  firms.  Some  of  the  observed  differences  may  be
attributable to differing policy environments.
31grows relative to the craft, wg grows to squeeze out excess profits in the
modern sector.  At the end of the development traverse, then, capital's share
again is rb'.  However in between, during the course of development, capital's
share will exceed rb'.  While the details depend on the exact specification,
under plausible assumptions capital's  share will take an inverted U shaped path
over the development trajectory. As development  proceeds and-the modern sector
expands, capital's share first will rise since quasi rents per unit of capital
are higher in the modern sector than the craft, and a growing share of capital
in that sector will more than offset the fact that rising wages will press down
on rents per unit of capital in both sectors.  Later, as the modern  sector
comes to be most of the economy, rising wages will diminish capital's share.
If one notes equation 2, one can see  that the expression  before QA\Q  in
equation 5b is proportional to the rate at which caoital is being shifted from
the craft to the modern sector, and hence the rate at which output per worker
and capital per worker are growing.  Thus capital's share will be high when
capital  and  output  are  growing  most  rapidly.  A -growth  accountant  would
naturally assign a good share of the credit for growth of output to growth of
capital.  If the supply of educated labor just keeps pace with the growth of
employment  in  the  modern  sector,  human  capital  also  will  be  growing  most
rapidly when output  is growing fast.
The foregoing captures the spirit of our argument in the text that, in
the  Asian  Miracle,  both  large  investments in  human  capital  and  forceful
entrepreneurship which  resulted in  a  growing modern  sector  and  diminishing
craft sector  (Table 6) were key ingredients, and that they complemented each
other strongly.  Absent the ability and inclination to greatly expand human
capital, aggressive  entrepreneurship  would have been stymied.  Absent aggressive
entrepreneurship, the returns to investment in human capital would have been
low.  And when both of these elements  were present,,  together  they made for high
and rising profits in the modern sector which provided the  finance for the
large  investments  in  physical  capital  that  were  necessary  for  rapid
assimilation.
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Alternate  Interpretations  of Growth
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Effect of Changes in Capital  per Unit of Labor on Share of
Capital in Output With Different  Elasticities  of Substitution
elasticity  of  10%  100%  200%  300%
substitution  Increase  Increase  Increase  increase
in  Capital in Capital in  Capital in Capital
per unit  per unit  per uinit  per unit
of labor  of labor  of labor  of labor
Share of Capital  in Output (initial  share
.30)
.2  .2264  .0261  .0053  .0017
.9  .2978  .2841  .2750  .2687
1.0  .3000  .3000  .3000  .3000
2.0  .3101  .3774  .4260  .4615
Note:  Tables  1  and  2  are  derived  in  the  following manner,  Assume  a  tCS
production function Q  =  A(8K-° +  (1-)L-P)L-"P. From this we  ean Obtain  the
following relationship between Q/L,  K/L, and SK,  the  share of  capital,  in
periods 1 and 2 respectively:
(Q/L),  =  8L/  +  (1-6)
(Q/L) 2 8(L/K)P  +  (1-6)
as well as the share of capital, SK  in the two periods as:
K 1 =  8  +  (1-8),(K 0/L0)
SK 2_-=  8  +  (1-6)  (K 1/Ll)>
The constant elasticity of substitution production function is undefined for
p=O.  In the  calculations, the Cobb-Douglas is  used when  the  elasticity  of
subsitution is unity. For the calculations in Tables 1 and 2, we define uhits
so that (K/L) 0 =  1. Then SKo  =.3 implies that S  =  .3.
35Table 2
Effect of Changes in Capital per Unit of Labor on Output per
Unit of Labor With Different  Elasticities  of Substitution
elasticity  10%  100%  20C%  300%
of  Increase  Increase  Increase  Increase
substitution  in Capital  in Capital  in Capital  in Capital
per unit  per unit  per unit  per unit
of labor  of labor  of labor  of labor
Percentage  change in output per unit of labor
.2  2.5  8.6  9.2  9.3
.9  2.9  22.4  37.1  48.3
1.0  2.9  23.1  23.1  51.6
2.0  2.9  26.4  26.4  69.0
36Table 3
Investment Ratios and Predicted Minus
Actual Growth Rates
Country  Investment/GDP  Actual minus predicted
1960-85  Growth Rate of GDP per
Capita
Korea  24.3  .024
Taiwan, China  26.5  .042
Algeria  25.7  .008
Spain  26.5  -.001
Greece  26.3  .008
Ireland  26.4  .007
Panama  25.0  .002
Portugal  23.7  -.002
Poland  36.8  -.019
37Table 4
Changes in Physical Production Levels
Selected Industrial Products
Taiwan (China)  1960-1990
Product  1960  1990
Man  Made  Fibers  - 1,762  1,785,731
millons of tons
Polyvinyl  Chloride  - 3,418  920,954
millons of tons
Steel  Bars  - millions  200,528  11,071,9991
of  tons
Machine Tools  0  755,597
Sewing Machines  61,817  2,514,727
Electric Fans  203,843  15,217,438
Television Sets  0  3,703,000
Motorcycles  0  1,055,297
Telephones  0  1,055,297
Radiqs  0  5,892,881
Tape Recorders  0  8,124,253
Flectronic Calculators  0  44,843,192
Iptegrated  Circuits  0  2,676,865
(1000)
Electronic Watches  0  5,115,695
Shipbuilding (tons)  27,051  1,211,607
Source; Taiwan Statistical  Data Book, 1992, Council for Economic Planning and
Development,  Republic  of China, Taipei, Table 5-6c.
38Table i
Share of Current Price Value Added Within Manufacturing
Sector  Korea  Korea  Korea  Taiwan  Taiwajt
(China)  (China)
1963  1973  1988  1966  1986
Food, bev.  .34  .18  .11  .29  .11
textiles, cloth.  .22  .22  *15  .15  .16
wood, furn.  .04  .05  .02  .04  .03
paper, printing  .06  .04  .04  .05  .04
chemicals, petro.  .11  .20  .17  .21  .23
non. met. min.  .04  .05  .04  .07  .03
steel, iron  .04  .08  .07  ,03  .06
metal  prod, machinery,  .12  .16  .36  .10  .18
electronics
other.  .02  .02  .02  .06  .13
Sources: Korea, United Nations Industrial Development Organization,Handbo6k of
Industrial Statistics, various years, Taiwan  (China), birectorate terleral  of
Accounting, Budget, and Statistics, The Report on  IndUstrial,  and  Commercial
Census of Taiwan -Fukien  Area, The Republic  of China) various years.
39Table  6
Percentage  Distribution  of Employment  by  Firm  Size
Number  of Employees
4-9  10-19  20-49  50-99  100-499  500+
Taiwan,  China
1954 
18  13  14  9  16  31 1961 
18  10  14  8  17  34 1971 
8  7  11  9  29  37 Index  of  Value  NA  100  91  100  117  259




17  16  21  13  21  12 1963 
15  14  16  12  21  22 1975 
4  5  8  9  30  44 Index  of  Value  NA  100  133  193  256  304
Added  Per  Worker,
1971
Source:  Ho,  1980,  Tables  3.1,  D2, D3.
Note:  NA,  not  available
40Table 7
R & D and Patenting  Activity in Taiwan (China)
Year  R&D/GDP  Total  Taiwan  Foreign
Patents  (China)  Patents
Nationals'
Patents
1981  .95a  6,265  2,897  3,368
1986  .98  10,526  5,800  4,726
1991  1.65b  27,281  13,555  13,726
Notes. a, 1984; b, 1990.
Source: Taiwan  Statistical Data Book, 1992. Table 6.7, 6.8
41Table 8
Learning in a  Korean Textile Factory
1986 Year  1977  1986  international.
best practice
Labor Productivity
kilogr4ms per manhour,  52.4  78.5  156.25
r4ng ppinning
kilograms  per manhour,  137.1  210.3  324.30
open end spinninga
mneters  per  manhour,  216.2  224.1  360.36
weaving
Machine Productivity
kilograms per spindle,  .20  .23  .21
ring  spinning
kilograms  per  rotor,  .91  1.26  1.11
open  end  spinning'
meters  per  lopms  36.1  35.4  39.8
weaving
Noze; a ,  initial year is 1979.
SQorce:  Columns  1  and  2  adapted  from  Amsden,  1989,  Table  10.4  Column  3
c4lcquateO from coluMn 2 plus coefficients from Pack, 1987, Tables 3.1 and 3.2
4nc4 oalculaions  underlying  those tables.
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